Former PC Sharon Taylor
Accelerated Hearing former Police Constable 294 Sharon TAYLOR
Date: Monday 10th December 2024
Chair: Assistant Chief Constable Nicholas DAVISON
Summary of Facts and Conduct
Introduction
I will provide a full and detailed findings on facts and outcome following this hearing as required. For the hearing now I outline a summary of my approach and decision:
- I have reminded myself of the threefold purpose and character of police misconduct proceedings, namely to:
Maintain public confidence in and reputation of the police service.
Uphold high standards in policing and deter misconduct.
Protect the public.
- I have had regard to a number of relevant legal authorities including Bolton, Redgrave, Salter, Williams, Green and Coke Wallis.
- I have also had regard to the framework of regulations and guidance including, The police conduct regulations 2020 as amended by 2024 Conduct amendment regulations, The Home Office guidance for those regulations, The College of Policing Code of Ethics 2024 and the College of Policing Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings 2023.
- Furthermore I have reminded myself that the burden of proof rests with the AA and that the standard of proof is the civil standard namely on the balance of probabilities (more likely than not). It is a single unvarying standard with no sliding scale.
- Finally, I have had regard to the decision of Wyn Williams J in CC Wiltshire v PAT (Woollard) noting the ruling concerning requirements concerning the proving of discreditable conduct.
Findings on Facts (Balance of Probability)
Having carefully considered all of the evidence before me I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the matters presented by the AA and held within the hearing bundle have been proved.
Particulars of Misconduct
- Honesty and Integrity
In that former Pc Taylor acted dishonestly and without integrity, in that:
(a) She dishonestly stated that she had been working on 10 March 2024 and claimed to be entitled to one hour’s anti-social pay. When in fact she had gone to Nottingham in rostered work time when she was meant to be on duty being paid at the public expense.
(b) That Pc Taylor dishonestly purported to have been working on the dates as set out at paras. 5- 9 of the Reg 51 notice when in fact she was not undertaking any meaningful work tasks.
(c) That Pc Taylor have failed to act with integrity in that she had purported to be performing duties when she was not in fact doing so.
(2) Performance of Duties
In that former Pc Taylor failed to perform her duties diligently and/or conscientiously on the dates set out at paras 5 – 9 in the regulation 51 notice.
(3) Orders and Instructions
In that former Pc Taylor’s behaviour as set out in paras 5 – 9 of the regulation 51 notice shows that she neither worked her rostered duties nor complied with the Modern Hybrid Working Practices in that she did not raise shift alterations with her line manager or obtain their approval to change her working pattern in relation to the dates identified in paras 5 – 9 of the regulation notice.
(4) Discreditable Conduct
In that former PC Taylor’s behaviour as set out above has discredited the police service and undermined public confidence in it.
Facts
I have received and considered the written evidence and exhibits secured by the Appropriate Authority.
DC Hindson has provided evidence of internal audit logs relating to the specific account and laptop assigned to Ms Taylor as well as her personal issue SALTO card which registers access to police buildings. This evidence sets out, on the balance of probability, given the nature of the tasks Ms Taylor was required to perform in her role that she did not attend her workplace and did not, other than briefly logging in and logging out of her personal constabulary OI account undertake any work as required by her role on 28th January, 4th February, 17th February and the 18th February 2024.
When DC Hindson’s evidence is seen in conjunction with the evidence provided by Mr Hughes, the former officers line manager in his statement and the DMS personal workbench provided in the evidence I consider it proved that on these dates Ms Taylor was meant to be on duty and at work as set out in the constabulary duties management system where the expected hours of working are set out and there is no evidence from Mr Hughes or the duties management system that Ms Taylor had either requested a change in shift or had asked for permission from Mr Hughes to work from home as she could have done, under the terms of her role, if she had asked for permission in advance. I note that all of these dates are at the weekends when her line manager would not have been at work on site.
Further, Mr Hughes evidence in his statement from 25th July 2024 sets out the nature of Ms Taylor’s role as exhibited by him as exhibit ARH1, having reviewed this exhibit in conjunction with Mr Hughes statement and Dc Hindson’s statement setting out the activity of Ms Taylor’s laptop I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that she had to use her lap top constantly to perform her role and that given no material can be removed from police premises, for her lap top to have no activity registered against it on these dates indicates that no meaningful required work for her role was being undertaken.
Further to this and in respect to Sunday 18th of February there is additional evidence that Ms Taylor’s personal vehicle was being driven on the A140 towards Norwich at 13:46hrs. Ms Taylor in her response confirms she was the driver going to attend a social event.
In respect to Sunday 10th March 2024 I find that Ms Taylor was rostered to be on duty that day. From the CCTV provided that showed Ms Taylor arrive and leave the police headquarters and the personal OI account activation I find that Ms Taylor attended her place of work, logged into her constabulary account for three minutes and then left the building and drove off in her personal car. From the evidence provided by Mr Crisp, a trained and authorised user of the national ANPR service I find that Ms Taylor’s vehicle made a journey that day to Nottingham and back from Nottingham to Norfolk. From the available evidence and information concerning the 10th March 2024, on the balance of probability, I am satisfied that Ms Taylor should have been at work that day but instead drove to Nottingham for her own personal gain when she was meant to be on duty undertaking work for the constabulary.
In respect to the request to clear her exceptions from the duties management system to her line manager, Mr Hughes, submitted on the 14th April. In respect to the exceptions and explanation provided in the email on the following dates:
18/02
10/03
Stating ‘Just late No claim’
I find on the balance of probabilities that these are false statements by Ms Taylor and that she dishonestly stated that she was working when all available evidence indicates she was not.
In respect to the POCASO system submission claiming payment for antisocial hours for Sunday 10th March 2024 I find this was dishonest and saw Ms Taylor seek to claim renumeration that she was not entitled to secure. By claiming she was stating that she was on duty during times when officers ae entitled to claim for being at work during times of the day deemed by their conditions of service to be anti -social and they are able to claim extra payment for working during that time. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Ms Taylor was in fact engaged in her own personal activity.
In addition to the evidence provided by the appropriate authority in the case against Ms Taylor I have considered her formal response and note that she accepts she acted without honesty and integrity. She regrets not seeking permission for the duties changes and that she understands and accepts that her conduct may bring discredit on the police service.
Breach of the Standard
Combining all the facts together, I find that the facts above satisfy all the charges of a breach of the Standard of Professional Behaviour, relating to honesty and integrity, performance of duties, order and instructions and discreditable conduct.
Assessment of Misconduct
I have had regard to regulations 2(1) which states:
Misconduct means a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify disciplinary action;
Gross misconduct means a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify dismissal.
I have further regard to regulation 41(15) of the Conduct regulations which provides that the person conducting the misconduct proceedings must:
In the case of a misconduct hearing review the facts of the case and decide whether the conduct of the officer concerned amounts to misconduct or gross misconduct or neither.
That each breach or the culmination of the breaches can amount to Gross misconduct.
In respect to the breach of the Professional Standard I find that Former PC Sharon Taylor breached the standard relating to honesty and integrity, performance of duties, order and instructions and discreditable conduct in that by she has brought discredit on the police service and undermined public confidence in policing and that it amounts to gross misconduct.
Additionally, I find the breach of the standard relating to honesty and integrity, performance of duties, order and instructions and discreditable conduct by the admission from Ms Taylor in respect to her response confirmed here today at this hearing and her acceptance that it amounts to gross misconduct.
I am satisfied that the breach to these standards is so serious that dismissal would be justified and I also come to that decision, additionally as Ms Taylor has admitted that her conduct amounts to gross misconduct. As such on my own assessment and that of the admission by Ms Taylor I find gross misconduct.
Summary of decision on outcome
Introduction
In determining the appropriate outcome in relation to the proven allegation I have had regard to the College of Policing’s Guidance on Outcomes, in particular accelerated hearings – former officers, the Home Office Guidance and the approaches drawn from Fulger LLP v Solicitors’ Regulation Authority 2014, which at a high level, sees the required approach as:
- conducting an assessment of the seriousness (culpability, harm, aggravating factors, mitigating factors) of the misconduct.
- keeping in mind the purpose of imposing the sanctions (confidence in, reputation of, deterrent to); and
- choose the sanction which most appropriately fulfils the purpose of imposing sanctions by starting with consideration of the least serious outcome first and progressing in seriousness until arriving at the appropriate outcome.
In following these stages I have also taken into account personal mitigation and had in mind, at all times, the need for proportionality, weighing the interests of the public with those of Ms Taylor.
Regardless that this is a former officer accelerated case this process must be followed and applied as though the former officer were still serving.
I have also reminded myself of the need to take care and avoid double counting factors in my assessment.
Assessing the seriousness
Culpability
Culpability denotes the persons blameworthiness or responsibility for their actions. The more culpable or blameworthy the behaviour in question, the more serious the misconduct and the more severe the likely outcome. Here, I have determined Ms Taylor’s culpability as high.
I consider that Ms Taylor’s actions in respect to the breaches were intentional, deliberate and planned. From the evidence presented I consider that she deliberately set out, on the dates in question, to appear to be working when in fact she was not. Logging in and out of her laptop being the most obvious example of this. Specifically on Sunday 10th March when she went to watch an event in Nottingham on a working day, Ms Taylor went so far as to attend her workplace, briefly log into her OI account before leaving for Nottingham.
On the 18th February she deliberately drove and attended a social function on a rostered work day. On that day and the other days set out in the regulation charges Ms Taylor deliberately logged into her OI account and after hours of no activity deliberately logged out. This has all the appearance of trying to look as though she was working and sees a pattern of behaviour.
In respect to the email to her supervisor seeking to clear Duty Management System exceptions on her account, Ms Taylor deliberately and intentionally wrote an untruth to her supervisor as an explanation for the raised exception on her duties record.
In respect to her submission for anti-social hours worked, Ms Taylor deliberately submitted a false claim stating that she was entitled to financial remuneration for hours worked.
The appropriate authority in their submission indicated that in respect to the 10th of March behaviour where Ms Taylor travelled to Nottingham, they have secured evidence from Ms Taylors’ OI account (that only she has access to) that internet research was being undertaken in the days before the 10th March about a comedian in Nottingham and parking in Nottingham. This amounts to further evidence of intentional planned behaviour.
In addition to the above there is evidence that these deliberate acts also involve dishonesty and a lack of integrity. Whilst not directly operational dishonesty, Ms Taylor’s decision on the 10th March 2024 to travel to Nottingham and see an entertainment show when she was meant to be on duty shows dishonesty and a lack of integrity in its own right. Beyond this to travel to the workplace first, log into her system appears on the evidence in front of me to be an attempt to ‘pretend to be at work’ further compounding the issue. Even if I am wrong on the motive for attending work and logging into her OI system, by going to Nottingham for a private engagement on a work day and then looking to provide a dishonest account to her supervisor for the DMS exception created and; then submitting a claim for anti-social hours payment entitlement is unacceptable behaviour for a police officer in respect to the standards of behaviour relating to honesty and integrity.
Harm
The harm caused by an officer’s actions can be considered in various ways including reputational harm and harm to the wider community’s public health. Harm to individuals. It also includes an act, whether on duty or duty where an officer commits an act that would harm public confidence if the circumstances of it were known to the public. Within this definition of harm, it is also applicable to consider the scale and depth of local or national concern about the behaviour in question.
Regarding harm resulting from Ms Taylor’s conduct, I acknowledge that there is no specific harm to any person involved.
However, I note in the college of policing guidance on outcomes at paragraph 4.66:
‘Always take misconduct seriously that undermines discipline and good order within the police service, even if it does not result in harm to individual victims.’
Here, Ms Taylor’s behaviour to not follow the rules required concerning her work and role undermines discipline and good order. If more police officers believed it was acceptable to behave in this way then it would harm the efficiency and effectiveness of the police service in turn harming public confidence.
Furthermore, for the public to understand that an officer was not undertaking work activity paid at the public expense, submitting false claims and behaving dishonestly then this would have a serious impact on public confidence in policing. If the public believes it cannot trust police officers to act with integrity or be honest given their role, responsibility and powers in society then the services ability to undertake its role on behalf of the public is seriously undermined.
Overall, I assess the harm occasioned as reputational harm.
Aggravating factors
I considered the following to be present:
Regular and repeated behaviour. Ms Taylor’s actions occurred over a period of time each amounting to a breach of the professional standards set out.
Continuing the behaviour after the officer should have realised that it was improper. Here, Ms Taylor knew she was not actually undertaking her role on each of the days yet she persisted. In respect to 10th March, Ms Taylor knew that going to Nottingham for a social event was not working yet she went on to claim for anti- social hours worked and looked to create a DMS record that she had worked.
Whilst pre-meditation, planning and taking deliberate steps are seen as aggravating factors in the guidance I have considered these elsewhere under culpability and therefore do not double count here.
Mitigating factors
Mitigating factors are those that tend to reduce the seriousness of the misconduct. Some factors may indicate that an officer’s culpability is lower, or the harm caused by the misconduct is less serious than it might otherwise have been.
Ms Taylor has accepted her conduct amounted to Gross misconduct and provided a detailed account within her Reg 31 (54) response. She has apologised for her behaviour [Section redacted].
Personal Mitigation
Having decided on seriousness of the misconduct I turn to any personal mitigation. In doing so, however I recognising the constraints placed upon personal mitigation by the legal authorities and cases: Salter and Williams.
Regardless of these positive submissions, in line with the law and due to the nature and purpose of disciplinary proceedings the weight of them is necessarily limited in my considerations.
Here I note Ms Taylor’s record of service.
Assessment of the seriousness of the misconduct
From my considerations set out in summary above I consider this to be a matter of serious misconduct involving dishonesty and a lack of integrity coupled with a high degree of culpability of behalf of Ms Taylor.
Outcome
Having earlier found the matter is one of gross misconduct, regulations concerning former officers requires me to consider only two possible outcomes: namely disciplinary action or no disciplinary action.
My decision is that the outcome is disciplinary action based on the seriousness of the matter before me and that a former serving police officer has been found to have breached a number of the standards of professional behaviour and in particular the stand relating to honesty and integrity.
I have reminded myself of the purpose of imposing sanctions under these regulations and I turn to my considerations on those available, as required by regulations and the accelerated cases guidance in the college of Policing guidance on outcomes should Ms Taylor have been a serving officer.
I am in no doubt that (had Ms Taylor still been in service) Management Advice and a Written Warning would have failed to adequately deal with the seriousness of her conduct and could not address the issue of dishonesty, let alone protect the public interest.
I then turned to consider whether this is a case where the appropriate disciplinary action would (notionally) have been a Final Written Warning.
In all the circumstances, I have determined that a Final Written warning would not (had Ms Taylor still been in service) have been appropriate due to the serious nature of the misconduct in particular the breaches of the standards of professional behaviour surrounding honesty and integrity and the impact that has on the public confidence in the police service and therefore the damage such dishonesty and lack of integrity has in bringing discredit to the reputation of the service. Therefore the only reasonable, proportionate and appropriate disciplinary action in this case is that Ms Taylor would have been dismissed. Such a sanction is also necessary to ensure serving officers understand the importance of honesty and integrity in their decisions, actions and behaviours and serving to prevent future similar behaviours from occurring within the service.
My decision on outcomes is that Ms Taylor, had she remained a serving officer would have been dismissed.
[Further sections redacted].
Nick Davison
Assistant Chief Constable
Chair
10/12/2024