



Regional Review Unit

Missing Person Review

Section 31

**(...) – Suffolk Constabulary
(Corrie McKeague)**

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1. Executive Summary

- Section 40*
Section 31 1.1 (...) is the investigation into High Risk Missing Person Corrie McKeague, 23yrs. Corrie was reported missing from his workplace (...) on Monday 26th September 2016.
- 1.2 The investigation was initially conducted by Divisional officers and managed on COMPACT and attracted significant local and national media attention. (...)
- Section 40*
Section 30 1.3 On the evening of Friday 23rd September, Corrie had driven to Bury St Edmunds (BSE) town centre to spend the evening with (...) colleagues, and was last seen (...) shortly after 1am Saturday 24th September in Flex night club.
- Section 30* 1.4 Suffolk Constabulary responded quickly to this incident and initiated localised searches of the missing persons home, vehicle and workplace, and within a relatively short space of time managed to secure CCTV footage from within Bury St Edmunds that depicted Corrie at a number of locations. Significantly he was identified in a shop doorway apparently asleep for approximately 2 hours, from where he is then observed to walk in an apparent intoxicated state along Brentgoval Street turning into a service area behind the Superdrug store, which is now referred to by the investigation as the 'Horseshoe'. This sighting is recorded at 03:25 (...)
- 1.5 There was an early appointment of an experienced SIO, Deputy SIO and (...) search co-ordinator within 48 hours of this missing person report.
- Section 40*
Section 30
Section 43 1.6 Early enquiries revealed a (...) refuse lorry entering the 'Horseshoe' area off Brentgoval Street (...) and removing waste from a large industrial waste bin (...)
- Section 40* 1.7 Following 10 days of enquiries, Norfolk and Suffolk Major Investigation Team (MIT) were tasked with assuming overall responsibility for the investigation with Detective Inspector (...) being appointed SIO. (Since promoted to DCI)
- Section 30* 1.8 Due to the complexity and high profile nature of the investigation, which quickly generated a considerable number of enquiries, the decision was taken to manage the operation on HOLMES. (...) A PIP 4 SIO was also appointed to support the SIO.

Section 31

- 1.9 As the investigation has progressed the SIO has sought timely and appropriate support (...) and commissioned (...) a targeted review by East Midlands Special Operation Unit (EMSOU) Regional Review Unit (RRU). This current review commenced with a SIO briefing on 17th August 2017 (...).
- Section 30* 1.10 Extensive enquiries have been conducted by the investigative team (...)
- Section 30*
Section 43 1.11 A number of hypotheses have been explored by the SIO, and whilst remaining open to any fresh information or evidence, the investigation has latterly centred on the hypothesis that Corrie, in a state of intoxication, has sought refuge in a commercial waste bin in the service area off Brentgoval Street, and then sadly, entered the waste disposal process. (...)
- 1.12 This current review, based upon the information provided, would support the current status of the investigation to remain as a missing person enquiry.
- Section 30* 1.13 Extensive enquiries have been conducted into the waste management process, (...)
- Section 30*
Section 43 1.14 Enquiries have been made into the ultimate disposal of waste from these bins through incineration, recycling and landfill. This review would concur with the view that although not impossible it is unlikely that the missing person has entered into the incineration or recycling process (...) and would support the favoured hypothesis of landfill site disposal. (...)
- Section 30*
Section 43 1.15 (...) search of the waste deposition cell (Cell 22) has been carried out over a 20 week period, and concluded in July 2017. Material recovered correlated to the BSE area and the time of Corrie's disappearance.
- Section 30* 1.16 (...)
- Section 31* 1.17 This is a complex investigation where considerable knowledge has been gained in the waste management process (...)
- Section 30* 1.18 Considering the competing demands on the force during the period of this investigation, a phenomenal amount of work has been completed by limited resources. (...)

1.19 As the review has progressed, both the SIO and PIP4 have been briefed on the headlines of the review, which centre on recommendations concerning:

- HOLMES/MIR management
- Evidencing relevant elements of the waste management process in witness statement format
- Expansion of CCTV viewing parameters
- Search of the eastern area of Cell 22
- Search of the surrounds of Red Lodge waste transfer station

1.20 There has been some exemplary work completed by staff involved in this investigation, in particular surrounding the investigation of the waste management process; (...), and the search of the Milton landfill site.

Section 31 1.21 The investigative aim of (...) has remained steadfast throughout with a clear determination by the SIO and all concerned to explore every reasonable line of enquiry to locate Corrie McKeague, who still remains a missing person at this time.

2. Brief Circumstances

Section 40 2.1 (...)
Section 30

Section 40 2.2 On the evening of Friday 23rd September 2016, Corrie drove into Bury St Edmunds (...) He then went on to meet up with (...) colleagues; together they visited various bars before ending up at Flex nightclub. (...) last seen him in the club around 1am on the morning of Saturday 24th September.
Section 30

Section 40 2.3 On Monday 26th September 2016 Corrie was reported missing (...) following his night out in Bury St Edmunds(...) A COMPACT missing person report¹ was created and enquiries began in an effort to identify Corrie's whereabouts
Section 30

Section 40 2.4 (...)
Section 30

Section 40
Section 30

¹ Police computerised system for the recording and management of missing from home enquiries.

2.5 Initial CCTV examination identified Corrie's movements through the night including the establishments in which he had been drinking. (...)

2.6 The last sighting of Corrie was at 03:25 on the 24th September 2016, where he was seen on Brentgoval Street in the town centre; the imagery shows him initially walking and then breaking into a short jog before stopping and looking to his right. He then turned and walked into the service area to his right behind a parade of shops. During the course of the investigation this area became known as the 'Horseshoe'.

Section 40
Section 30
Section 43 2.7 The CCTV enquiries led to the early identification of a (...) refuse lorry entering the Horseshoe area (...) where it removed waste from a large industrial waste bin (...)

2.8 Despite a protracted investigation into Corrie's disappearance, which involved significant search activity and exhaustive enquiries into the waste disposal industry, the efforts to locate this missing person have to date proved negative.

3. Terms of Reference

3.1 The review into this High Risk Missing Person case was commissioned by DCC Stephen Jupp of Suffolk Constabulary.

Section 40 3.2 East Midlands Special Operations Unit (EMSOU) Regional Review Unit (RRU) was commissioned to conduct the review headed by lead Review Officer (...).

3.3 Aim

1. To support the SIO in his decision making about next steps in the investigation.
2. To identify whether there are any other key lines of enquiry that should be pursued or pursued further that could lead to information that would locate Corrie McKeague or assist in establishing the circumstances of his disappearance.
3. To provide confidence to the public that all reasonable lines of enquiry have been properly considered in the search for Corrie McKeague.

Objectives

The review should focus on the following areas:

Section 40
Section 30 a) A detailed review of the waste line of enquiry to identify whether there are any other enquiries that could be carried out (...)

Section 30 b) A detailed review of the search conducted to date (...)

- Section 30* c) The review should identify whether there are any other (...) search options: (...)
- Section 30* d) A review and analysis of (...) the key hypotheses, to include in particular the reviewer's opinion on the current status of the investigation (i.e. a missing person enquiry) and prioritisation of the key hypotheses.
- Section 30* e) To ensure that all viable scenarios have been captured within hypotheses (...).
- f) Any key lines of enquiry not identified or identified but not pursued and comment on the investigative opportunities that may exist within these.

4. Methodology

- Section 40* 4.1 On Thursday 17th August 2017, the review team received a detailed power point briefing from the SIO, Detective Chief Inspector (...) The circumstances and progress of the case were explained and the current main lines of enquiry highlighted.
- Section 40*
Section 30 4.2 Following the briefing, the team were then escorted by the SIO to view significant locations within Bury St Edmunds (...).
- Section 40*
Section 31 4.3 The Deputy SIO, (...), was appointed as single point of contact (...) Other members of the MIR provided assistance to the review where necessary with all parties being extremely supportive of the review process.
- 4.4 The live HOLMES account was accessed during the review, but it is highlighted that some of the issues commented upon within this report may have been furthered over recent weeks as the review was conducted at a point in time in the investigation.
- Section 31* 4.5 (...)
- Section 31* 4.6 (...)
- 4.7 During the review there has been constant dialogue with the SIO and PIP4 and headline briefings given as the review has progressed.
- 4.8 On 27th September 2017, at the request of Suffolk Constabulary, the review provided the force with a documented response to a request for advance notice of any recommendation to the further search of Milton landfill site. (See Section 6 – Search Strategy)

5. Investigative Strategy

Section 40
Section 30 5.1.1 This investigation was originally managed by Divisional officers and enquiries documented and managed within the COMPACT missing persons system. (...)

Section 30 5.1.2 Suffolk Constabulary response was both timely and thorough with the early appointment of an experienced SIO, Deputy SIO and (...) search co-ordinator. (...) During the early stages of this enquiry significant movements of the missing person were established within Bury St Edmunds town centre which highlighted the last known sighting at 03:25 as Corrie entered the service area off Brentgoval Street.

Section 40
Section 30
Section 31 5.1.3 On 3rd October 2016 Norfolk and Suffolk Major Investigation Team were tasked with assuming overall responsibility for the missing person enquiry and D/Insp (...) was appointed as SIO. D/Insp (...) made the early decision to manage the enquiry via HOLMES due to the volume of actions already raised; (...) and the scope for a large number of witnesses to be sought and identified.

Comment

It is the responsibility of the SIO to develop and implement the investigative strategy, and in cases such as this an effective management system should be put in place to ensure that all material is recorded and analysed to enable the SIO to make appropriate and timely decisions to progress the investigation.

A well managed HOLMES Major Incident Room (MIR) is entirely appropriate in this case and the decision to manage this enquiry via HOLMES is supported by the review.

5.2 HOLMES/MIR

Section 30 5.2.1 This review was not specifically commissioned to review HOLMES or the MIR but it was agreed with the SIO that where any relevant issues were identified during the review they would be brought to the SIO's attention. (...)

Section 30
Section 31 5.2.2 It is apparent from discussions with the SIO (...), that resourcing of the MIR has been a continuing problem, whilst trying to balance the competing demands of other major investigations during the last 12 months. (...) (...)

Section 30

5.2.3 A mature discussion has been held by the review officer and the SIO with regards to HOLMES/MIR management. Although the SIO recognises the importance of all the roles within the MIR, and the necessity to manage and prioritise Actions, he accepts there is a need to have a refreshed approach to HOLMES management in line with the current state and progress of the enquiry.

Section 30 5.2.4 This HOLMES/MIR management review is clearly needed when recognising the amount of Actions (...)

Section 30

Recommendation 1:
That the HOLMES MIR queues are reviewed with cognisance of the key investigative hypothesis (...)

Section 31 5.2.5 The Office Manager is responsible for reading all documentation and approving it for filing. (...) (...), it appears that it is a role which is not being performed to any meaningful degree on this investigation. *Section 30*

Section 31

Recommendation 2:
That consideration is given to fulfilling the role and position of Office Manager (...)

Section 30 5.2.6 (...)

5.2.7 A number of different individuals have been allocated responsibility for these strategies but the overall supervision of all these strategies has remained with the SIO throughout the entire investigation.

Comment

This is a complex investigation and whilst accepting that the Deputy SIO has performed the role of SIO on a number of other investigations over the last 12 months, greater consideration should have been given by the SIO to a more equitable distribution of supervisory responsibilities between the SIO and his Deputy.

- 5.2.8 During this review, anecdotal evidence has been provided of key strategies and enquiries being pursued in isolation of each other. This on occasions, may in some part be due to the enquiry becoming somewhat fragmented due to abstractions to other investigations, but as the investigation strives towards the completion of all relevant enquiries, consideration needs to be given to resurrecting investigative briefings involving all staff. Recognising the impending decision to be made concerning the extended search of Cell 22, such briefings, should wherever possible, include the lead (...)

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Section 30

Recommendation 3:

That the investigative briefings are re-initiated and as a minimum held on a weekly basis. (...)

5.3 SIO Hypotheses

*Section 40
Section 30*

- 5.3.1 (...). This is a difficult and complex investigation and a number of hypotheses have been considered by the SIO. (...):

*Section 40
Section 30*

- 5.3.2 (...)

*Section 30
Section 43*

- 5.3.3 In furtherance of the hypothesis of Corrie seeking shelter in a commercial bin, is the (...) refuse lorry which enters the 'Horseshoe' (...) and collects the excessive waste (116kg) from the bin (...).

- 5.3.4 It is important to note that this hypothesis has not been investigated at the exclusion of all others; it is clear that the SIO has remained open minded to exploring all possible scenarios but has prioritised this particular hypothesis as the investigation has progressed, based on the information gathered, and following constant review.

6. Search Strategy

Section 30

6.1 In addressing this area of the review, interviews have been conducted with the SIO, Lead and peer group (...); site visits made at BSE, Red Lodge transfer waste station and Milton landfill site, and relevant documents examined (...).

Section 30 6.2 (...).

Comment

In short, appropriate areas have been clearly defined and prioritised for search with supporting rationale. The methods and resources used have been entirely appropriate and two key areas are highlighted:

Section 30 • (...) Bury St Edmunds (BSE) (...).

Section 30 • Milton landfill site (...).

The planning, dedication and professionalism of all those concerned in the landfill search is to be applauded and clearly demonstrates the determination of Suffolk Constabulary to explore every reasonable line of enquiry to locate this missing person.

Section 30 6.3 **Waste Disposal Review**

The last confirmed sighting of Corrie McKEAGUE was captured (...) at 03:25 Saturday 24/09/2016 and depicts Corrie heading towards an area referred to as the 'Horseshoe' behind shops off Brentgoval Street.

6.4 The Horseshoe area is best described as an off road semi-circular service area behind a number of shops; which includes the Superdrug store and Greggs, and is used for limited parking and the storage of large trade waste type bins.

Section 40 6.5 CCTV captures a (...) waste lorry, (...). This lorry is later seen on CCTV (...) in the BSE
Section 30
Section 43 town centre.

Section 30 6.6 The Police initially searched the PLS area on 27/09/2016. Attending officers reported on COMPACT that the bins in the area were searched (...).

Section 40 6.7 (...)
Section 30

Section 30 6.8 (...).

Comment

The nature of search conducted of the bins is what is normally expected when searching for a missing person.

Section 30

It is accepted that some considerable time has elapsed since the searches were made, but it is recommended that the search officers provide witness statements concerning the specific searches of bins (...).

Section 30

Recommendation 4:

That officers concerned in the searches of bins (...), on Tuesday 27th September 2016, should provide witness statements (...).

Section 40 6.9

On 29/11/2016 (...) of the Major Investigation Team joined the investigation and was tasked with the reviewing the Waste Disposal Process. (...) has been interviewed for the purposes of this review, and it is acknowledged that he has achieved a significant understanding of the waste management process as a result of his enquiries.

Section 40 6.10
Section 30

Certain facts had been established by the time (...) joined the enquiry: (...)

Section 40 6.11
Section 30

(...), it was established in February 2017, following analysis of the raw data, that the actual weight of this particular waste collection was in fact 116kg. This had a significant impact on the hypotheses being considered by the SIO and gave impetus to search activity surrounding this particular waste.

Comment

Section 30
Section 43

The review, following examination of all relevant material; (...), is satisfied that the collection (...) 24/09/2017, was recorded at 116kg. Great credit must be given to the tenacity shown by the Investigation team (...).

Section 40 6.12
Section 30

A comprehensive understanding of the process of collecting waste through to its ultimate disposal was required (...).

Section 40 6.13
Section 30

(...).

6.14 **Bins located within the Horseshoe.**

Section 30

Within the Horseshoe area (...)large trade waste bins were located. (...)

Section 30
Section 43 (...)

Comment

Section 40
Section 30
Section 43 (...)

Section 40
Section 30

Recommendation 5:
That witness statements are obtained (...) regarding waste collections made on Monday 26th September 2016, (...).

Section 30 6.15 (...)
Section 43 6.16 (...)
6.17 (...).

Section 30 6.18 (...) the weight, as previously highlighted, is now known to be 116 kg and generated
Section 43 significant enquiries (...).

Section 40 6.19 (...)
Section 30 (...)
Section 43

Section 30 (...)
Section 43

Comment

Section 40 (...)
Section 30
Section 43

Section 30
Section 43

Recommendation 6:
That witness statements are obtained (...) pertinent to the waste collections made (...).

Section 30
Section 43

(...)

6.20 **Red Lodge Waste Transfer Centre**

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Section 43

The Red Lodge Waste Transfer Centre is owned by FCC Environmental Services and receives waste from Suffolk County Council, commercial companies (...), and household waste recycling centres. (...).

6.21 The waste is deposited into a partially covered large bay which is sub-divided into four separate areas:

Bay 1 – Dry recyclable waste – contents to recycling centres.

Bay 2 – Suffolk County Council from household waste (black bin) - contents to be incinerated.

Bay 3 – Trade waste from commercial waste collections – contents to landfill.

Bay 4 – Wood from household recycling centres – contents to be recycled.

Green compost waste is processed in a separate area adjacent to the covered bays.

6.22 The four bays are sectioned off with concrete dividers that protrude out of the front of the bays. The dividers do not reach the full height to the bay roof and as a consequence there is the slight possibility that on occasions waste from different bays could become mixed.

6.23 When depositing vehicles enter the site they do so under controlled conditions and under the direction of Red Lodge staff, reversing their vehicle into the appropriate bay. The drivers then deposit their load at the front of the bay whereupon the waste is then pushed up and back by a loader driven by a Red Lodge employee.

6.24 The waste is removed from the site by large forty foot container lorries that are reversed into a sunken pit to the front of Bay 2. The Loader is then able to easily scoop up the waste from the bays and deposit the load into the container lorry. The container lorries are only filled with waste from one bay as each bay,s contents are dispatched to different locations and subject to different processes.

Section 30
Section 43

6.25 (...)waste lorry (...) entered the Red Lodge site at (...) and tipped its load (...) and exited the site (...).

Section 30
Section 43

6.26 (...).

Comment

Section 30
Section 43

(...). The weight of waste tipped at Red Lodge (...), indicating that the (...) Waste lorry was almost full to capacity.

Section 30 6.27
Section 43

(...).

Section 30 6.28

(...).

Comment

Section 43

It is unknown whether Corrie would have survived if he had been tipped from the black waste bin (...) into the (...) waste lorry (...).

It is clear that Corrie does not still remain within the bays at Red Lodge owing to all bays having been cleared on numerous occasions during the 12 months since the investigation started.

It is recommended, however, that as there is no definitive proof that Corrie has not survived being transferred to Red Lodge, that a search is conducted of the grounds and surrounds of the transfer centre.

Section 30

Recommendation 7:

That consideration is given to a (...) search of the grounds and surrounds of Red Lodge waste transfer centre.

Section 40 6.29
Section 30
Section 43

(...):

6.30 FCC Landfill site at Milton, Cambridgeshire

The FCC Environmental Landfill site is based at Milton, Cambridgeshire. Waste is processed from Suffolk and Cambridgeshire and the site takes waste from industrial waste, domestic waste, trade waste and soils.

6.31 Vehicles containing waste enter the site via the weighbridge which records the weight of the vehicle on entry and again weighs the vehicle on exiting the site. This results in the weight of each load deposited being recorded.

6.32 The entire landfill site is set in 71.2 hectares. The area that was being used to take waste during September 2016 was an area known as Cell 22. Cell 22 is approximately 14 hectares in size.

6.33 After being weighed on entry the waste container lorries make their way to Cell 22 and either reverse onto the cell, or, dependent upon weather conditions, may have to be towed backwards by a Milton Loader. The tipping of waste is completed in a controlled manner with the loader operator directing operations.

Section 30 6.34 (...). The site processes around 100,000 tonnes of waste per year.

Section 30
Section 43 6.35 During the construction of a Cell strict criteria have to be met to the satisfaction of the Environment Agency (EA) in order to be permitted to deposit waste. (...).

Section 30
Section 43 6.36 (...).

Section 40
Section 30
Section 43 6.37 The site manager (...) was able to assist in identifying the most likely area that waste was being tipped in from the 19 - 30/09/2016. (...).

Comment

Section 40
Section 30 (...). **The review concurs with that decision and has found nothing to contradict the parameters of the initial search area at Milton Landfill.**

Section 30 6.38 A SIO (...) decision was made on 04/10/2016 to request this area of the landfill to be preserved and remain untouched until further consideration had been given as to the necessity to carry out a full search of the site.

Section 30 6.39 In early February 2017 the (...) bin weight had been confirmed as 116kgs and not 11kgs (...).

Section 40
Section 30 6.40 On 06/03/2017 a search of the preserved area commenced. This challenging task was lead by (...). It is acknowledged that he has completed a thorough and extremely well documented record of the search over a 5 month period.

6.41 Material unearthed during the search added validity to the search area as it correlated to BSE and the relevant time frame. Following the excavation and sifting of over 6604 tonnes of waste and earth material, which penetrated down to the depth of the cell lining, the search was suspended on 21/07/2017.

Comment

Section 40
Section 30 (...).

- Section 30** 6.42 (...).
- Section 43**
- 6.43 (...).
- 6.44 (...).
- 6.45 (...).
- 6.46 (...):
- 6.47 (...).
- 6.48 (...).

Comment

- Section 30** (...).

As a consequence, the review would support the decision of Suffolk Constabulary to complete the search of the identified eastern area of Cell 22.

Section 31

**Recommendation 8:
That consideration is given to extending the landfill search at FCC Milton, Cambridgeshire (...) relating to the eastern area of Cell 22.**

- Section 30** 6.49 (...).
- Section 43**

6.50 Viridor Masons Landfill site Great Blakenham

This is a deep landfill site that takes waste from Suffolk, Norfolk and Essex. This site processes waste by creating cells that have been dug approximately 50m into the ground, and when full the cell is capped off at approximately 50m above ground, making a cell height of around 100m.

- 6.51 Waste is driven onto the site and tipped into the cell before being then pushed and compacted by a 40 ton compactor vehicle. Viridor Masons Landfill site is a far larger site than the Milton Landfill site and the waste is subjected to multiple compactions. The

increased compactions means that the extraction and search process would make it more difficult to separate the waste out.

6.52 The active Cell receiving waste during the first week in October 2016, is described as being approximately 400m in length with 50m deep layers. Viridor Masons Landfill takes around 150,000 tonnes of waste per year, with the active cell receiving waste on a daily basis.

Section 30
Section 43

6.53 (...).

Comment

Section 30
Section 40
Section 43

(...) excavation would not be possible owing to the enormity of the site, there being no starting point and the (...) nature of the items deposited there. (...).

Section 30
Section 43

The SIO reflects in his recent report (...) in that they are not allowed to remove waste once it has been deposited.

6.54 **FCC Landfill site at Milton, Cambs (North West area)**

Section 30
Section 43

From 05/10/2016 Milton Landfill recommenced receiving waste again. (...).

Section 40
Section 30
Section 43

6.55 (...).

Section 30
Section 43

6.56 (...).

Comment

Section 30
Section 43

(...), the South Eastern area of Cell 22 is viewed as the area most likely to provide an opportunity of success.

Section 43

6.57 **(...) Energy from Waste Facility (EFW) at Great Blakenham, Ipswich.**

The waste from Bay 2 at Red Lodge Waste Transfer Centre is sent to be incinerated and converted via a furnace / steam generator process to supply electricity at the EFW facility. The storage pit on the site must hold a minimum of 1500 tonnes of waste as that equates to 48 hours of burning material. The incinerator burns approximately 5600

tonnes of waste every 7 days and is a continuous 24 hour process. On average the waste pit contains 6500 tonnes of waste at any given time.

Section 43 6.58 The EFW facility aim to search a percentage of waste from container lorries on a weekly basis. Around 20% of a containers waste is tipped and then (...) raked by operatives. They are searched for non-conforming material, such as small electrical items (...).

6.59 Due to the size and depth of the waste pit and the amount of waste stored within it, it could be possible for waste product to be within the pit for several months without being placed into the incinerator.

Section 30 6.60 (...).
Section 43

Section 30 6.61 The investigation team were told that the waste burns at a temperature of 1100 degrees. At this temperature large human bone cannot fully burn. If a body had been burnt in the incinerator then any unburnt product would remain. (...).
Section 43

6.62 The five products are ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals, oversize aggregate (house bricks, rubble and other waste over 20mm), medium aggregate screened to 20mm and ash (fine aggregate).

Section 30 6.63 (...).
Section 43

Section 40 6.64 The EFW site was searched by officers over a 2 day period (...). During the search period (...) bone fragments were seized. These were later examined by experts (...) none of the bone fragments were found to contain human bone.
Section 30

Section 40 6.65 (...).
Section 30
Section 43

Comment

Section 40 (...). It is possible that if either contained a body it could have been transferred to the EFW (...).
Section 30
Section 43

Section 43 6.66 (...) Waste Disposal Centre, (...).

This facility takes waste (...) which is trade recyclable waste (...).

Section 30 6.67 (...). Waste arrives at the Whites site in two forms, mixed recyclable waste that requires sorting and recyclable waste that has been previously sorted and requires bailing.
Section 43

Section 40
Section 30
Section 43

6.68 (...).

6.69 (...).

Comment

Section 43 (...), the review would support the SIO in this being an unlikely method of disposal.

6.70 **Viridor Waste Recycling Plant, Great Blakenham**

Section 40
Section 30
Section 43 This site is used to process recyclable waste collections by Suffolk County Council and bagged recyclable waste collections from Essex. The site processes on average 350 tonnes of waste per day and receives recyclable waste from Bay 1 at Red Lodge Transfer Centre.

Section 43 6.71 (...)

Section 40 6.72 (...) the manager at this site has provided a statement explaining the recycling processes employed at his company. He states that owing to the close scrutiny undertaken by his staff in sifting the material, a body would have been discovered.

Comment

Section 30
Section 43 (...).

7. CCTV

7.1 The recovery and viewing of CCTV from the centre of Bury St Edmonds has played a significant part in the progress and direction of the investigation.

Section 31 7.2 Bury St Edmonds is a small market town with pubs, bars and clubs being confined to a relatively small area. This area is well covered by (...) CCTV systems.

Section 30 7.3 (...), Divisional Officers were initially tasked with the viewing of CCTV within the town centre to identify Corrie and establish his movements. On the night of 23/09/16 Corrie was known to be wearing a distinctive pink coloured long sleeved shirt and white trousers which assisted identification. From viewing CCTV footage it was possible to track his movements as he walked through the town centre and visited various licensed premises.

Section 30 7.4 (...).
7.5 (...).

Section 31 7.6 The last sighting of Corrie (...) was at 03:25 24/09/16. At that time he was alone on Brentgoval Street entering an area now referred to as the Horseshoe. This is a paved service area that gives pedestrian and vehicle access to the rear of commercial premises. Waste bins that service the various premises are also located there. (...).

Section 31 7.7 Viewing of the (...) CCTV did not identify Corrie leaving the horseshoe area. (...).

Section 30 7.8 (...).
7.9 (...).

Section 30 7.10 (...). This work was carried out in accordance with the defined parameters and strategy.

Section 30 7.11 The initial priority was to identify Corrie's movements after the last sighting of him at 03:25 24/09/16 when he entered the area of the Horseshoe. (...).

Section 30 7.12 (...).

Section 30 7.13 The parameter for recovery and viewing was later expanded and recorded (...).

Section 30

Recommendation 9:

That CCTV footage captured from within BSE is viewed to the expanded parameter (...).

Section 31

Comment

The securing of CCTV footage is often vital to the success of an investigation. (...).

Section 30 7.14
Section 43

(...), a (...)waste lorry was observed to enter the Horseshoe in the vicinity of where Corrie McKeague was last seen and leave shortly afterwards. It was later established that the lorry collected the contents of a waste skip from the rear of (...) premises.

Section 30 7.15 (...).

Section 30 7.16 (...) officers have also repeatedly viewed CCTV footage (...) there are no further sightings (...).

Comment

Section 30 (...).

Section 30 7.17 In order to test the possibility of Corrie leaving the Horseshoe on foot, without being captured on the CCTV, a reconstruction / test was conducted (...).

Comment

Section 30
Section 31 **The reconstruction to test the performance and coverage of the CCTV systems (...) surrounding the Horseshoe is viewed as good practice. It provided reassurance as to the reliability and performance of the (...) CCTV systems.**

Section 31
Section 30 **The Review Officers visited the centre of Bury St Edmonds and have viewed the locations of the (...) CCTV cameras (...) of the horseshoe. The CCTV coverage has been viewed and it is agreed that is extremely unlikely for Corrie to have left the area on foot (...).**

Section 31 7.18 Whilst the (...) staff concentrated on viewing the (...) CCTV systems in the vicinity of the Horseshoe, the obtaining of additional resources to view the wider CCTV coverage in Bury St Edmonds was problematic. (...) additional resources were required to expand the viewing capability of the investigation. (...) CCTV volunteers and Special Constables were then utilised to view the CCTV footage from outer areas of the Town Centre. No further sightings of Corrie were obtained. This provided support to the view that he had not left the area of the Horseshoe.

Section 30 7.19 From viewing the extensive CCTV coverage in the town centre it was possible to identify footage of individuals who were in the locality during the period that Corrie was out socialising. From the footage obtained (...) individuals have been identified who either interacted with Corrie or were in the same area. These people have been identified, traced and interviewed as to their knowledge and contact with Corrie (...). Persons / vehicles entering and leaving the Horseshoe have also been identified (...).

Comment

Section 30

During the review period an anniversary appeal was made by Suffolk Constabulary (...).

Section 30 7.20 Specialist CCTV resources (...) were used to support conventional CCTV viewing in the analysing of CCTV footage (...).

Section 31 7.21 The viewings by the Volunteers, Specials and Specialists did not provide any further sightings of Corrie in the town centre. (...).

Section 30 7.22 Further CCTV seizure and viewings have taken place in relation to specific reported sightings of Corrie by members of the public. (...).

Section 30 7.23 Specific locations (...) has also been the subject of CCTV investigation. (...)
Section 43

Comment

Section 30 The Suffolk Police (...), Volunteers, Specials and Officers from the MIT have completed a thorough examination of the relevant CCTV footage. In total it is estimated that 2000 hours of CCTV footage has been viewed in the course of the investigation to date. With the limited resources available this is a significant achievement.

The identification of a large number of individuals who were in the town centre of Bury St Edmonds on the night Corrie disappeared also demonstrates the effort and commitment of those involved in the CCTV investigation.

The identification of initial wider time parameters for the seizure of CCTV may have assisted the investigation in relation to further footage then being available as the investigation progressed.

Section 31 8. (...)

Section 30 8.1 (...).

Section 40 8.2 (...).
Section 30

Comment

Section 40 (...).
Section 30

Section 40 8.3 (...).
Section 30 8.4 (...).
Section 43 8.5 (...).

8.6 (...).
Section 30 8.7 (...).
8.8 (...).

Section 30 8.9 (...).
Section 43

Section 40 8.10 (...).
Section 30
Section 43

Comment

Section 30 (...).

Section 31 (...).

Section 40 8.11 (...).
Section 30

Comment

Section 40 (...).
Section 30

Section 30 8.12 (...).
Section 43 8.13 (...).

Section 30 8.14 (...)

Comment

Section 31 (...).

Section 30 8.15 (...).
Section 43

Section 40 8.16 (...).
Section 30
Section 31
Section 43

Comment

Section 40
Section 30
Section 43

(...).

Section 30 8.17 (...).

Section 43 8.18 (...).

Section 40 8.19 (...)

Section 30 8.20 (...).

Section 30 8.21 (...).

Section 31

Comment

Section 30 (...).

Section 31 8.22 (...).

Section 40 8.23 (...).

Section 30

Comment

Section 31 (...).

Section 30

Section 30 8.24 (...).

Section 40 8.25 (...).

Section 30

Comment

Section 40 (...).

Section 30

Section 31

Section 43

The review into this area of the investigation has established that all reasonable lines of enquiry have been pursued and the evidence gathered used to support the SIO's favoured hypotheses that Corrie sought shelter in a waste bin and was subsequently transported to a waste disposal site.

Section 31 8.26 (...)

Section 30 (...)

Comment

Section 30 The (...) produced was extremely thorough, well considered and well presented. It appears to be based on a model that has been adopted by Suffolk Constabulary and is very similar to those seen around other force areas. (...). This (...) was also utilised to good effect (...).

Section 30 8.27 (...).

Comment

Section 31 It is understood that not all of the Suffolk (...) who could be utilised in major crime investigations have received training in Major Incident (...).

Section 31

Recommendation 10:
That consideration is given to reviewing the number of (...) requiring training in Major Investigation (...) within Suffolk Constabulary.

9. Forensic Strategy

Section 30 9.1 (...).

Section 30 9.2 (...).
Section 43

Section 30 9.3 (...).

Section 30 9.4 (...)

Section 30 (...).
Section 43

Comment

Section 30 (...).
Section 43

Section 30 9.5 (...).

9.6 (...).

Section 30
Section 43

9.7 At the end of February 2017 a weight discrepancy was identified relating to the (...) general waste bin (...).

Section 30 9.8 (...).

9.9 (...).

9.10 (...).

Comment

Section 30 (...) the review feels there is still merit in pursuing further examination of the bins (...).

Section 31 (...)

Recommendation 11:

Section 30 That consideration is given to submitting (...) for (...) analysis (...).

Recommendation 12:

Section 30
Section 31 That consideration is given to consulting (...).

Recommendation 13:

Section 30
Section 31 That consideration is given to using (...).

Comment

Section 31 (...).

Section 31 10. (...)

Section 31 10.1 The actions, lifestyle and contacts of a missing person in the days, weeks and even months before their disappearance can often give an insight into that person's usual habits and movements. (...).

- Section 40* 10.2 (...).
Section 30
- Section 30* 10.3 During the early stages of this missing person investigation, (...) enquiries were identified (...) and acknowledged by the SIO as being important to this investigation.
- Section 30* 10.4 Some (...) decisions were made by the SIO to initiate relevant enquiries, (...).
- Section 30* 10.5 On 16th January 2017 the SIO recorded that the (...) enquiries conducted at that stage had failed to provide any positive responses. (...).
- Section 30* 10.6 (...).
Section 43
- Section 30* 10.7 (...).
- Section 40* 10.8 (...).
Section 30
- Section 30* 10.9 (...).
10.10 (...).
- Section 31* 10.11 The (...) enquiries conducted to date have been extensive and are now almost complete. There have been no positive results. During this review process however, other actions which may be considered as being relevant to the (...) line of enquiry and possibly worthy of investigation, are shown as not having been allocated. (...):
Section 40
Section 30
Section 43
- Section 40* 10.12 (...).
Section 30
Section 43

Comment

- Section 30* (...).
- Section 30* 10.13 (...).
- Section 31* 10.14 (...).
- Section 30* 10.15 (...).

Recommendation 14:
That in completing (...) enquiries, consideration is given to initiating a (...) enquiry (...).

Section 30

11. Conclusion

- Section 30* 11.1 Suffolk Constabulary have conducted a thorough investigation into this high risk missing person report, and demonstrated a clear determination to locate Corrie McKeague by exploring all reasonable lines of enquiry. The enquiries conducted (...) and the search operation conducted at Milton landfill site have been exemplary, and testament to the efforts of those involved.
- Section 30* 11.2 A number of hypotheses have been considered by the appointed SIO and explored (...).
- Section 40
Section 30* 11.3 Considering Corrie's state (...) during the early hours of 24/09/2016, (...), and supported by the CCTV evidence (...), the very sad but most likely hypothesis is that Corrie's body has been disposed of through the waste disposal process.
- 11.4 The CCTV evidence supports Corrie remaining within the 'Horseshoe' area off Brentgoval Street with the slight, but unlikely, possibility that he has exited this area onto Short Brackland. The commercial waste bins associated with these areas have been subjected to detailed research by the police investigation and followed through the incineration, recycling and landfill processes.
- Section 30* 11.5 (...).
- Section 30
Section 43* 11.6 (...), it is technically possible that Corrie's body could have been disposed of via the **incineration** plant process. (...).
- Section 30
Section 43* 11.7 In terms of the **recycling** process, (...). The review would agree that this method of disposal is therefore unlikely.
- Section 30
Section 43* 11.8 Considering the reported excessive bin weight identified relating to the (...) waste bin (116kg), (...), the most likely area of disposal is through the **landfill** process.

Section 30
Section 43

- 11.9 Taking account of the rationale which directed the search of Milton landfill site, the review gives support to the searching of the eastern area of Cell 22 based on the (...) data. The review also makes recommendation to the searching of the grounds and surrounds of the Red Lodge waste transfer centre, as there is no definitive proof, as unlikely as it may be, that Corrie has not survived transportation in the (...) refuse lorry.
- 11.10 In considering the current state and progress of the investigation, it is recommended that a HOLMES/MIR management review is conducted and the investigation supported by appropriate resources to conclude all outstanding relevant enquiries.

Reviewing Officer

Section 40 (...)

Head of EMSOU Regional Review Unit

This report prepared by the EMSOU Regional Review Unit remains the property of Suffolk Constabulary and the Senior Investigating Officer will be responsible for all aspects of disclosure and the requirements under the Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996 in the event of any criminal prosecution.

Appendix

Section 40
Section 30

(A) List of Recommendations

Section 30

Recommendation 1:
That the HOLMES MIR queues are reviewed with cognisance of the key investigative hypothesis (...).

Section 31

Recommendation 2:
That consideration is given to fulfilling the role and position of Office Manager (...).

Section 30

Recommendation 3:
That the investigative briefings are re-initiated and as a minimum held on a weekly basis. The briefings should involve all members of the team, (...).

Section 30

Recommendation 4:
That officers concerned in the searches of bins (...), should provide witness statements recording the specific detail and timings of those searches, (...).

Section 40
Section 30

Recommendation 5:
That witness statements are obtained (...) regarding waste collections made on Monday 26th September 2016, (...).

Section 30
Section 43

Recommendation 6:
That witness statements are obtained supported by raw data pertinent to the waste collections made (...).

Section 30

Recommendation 7:
That consideration is given to a (...) search of the grounds and surrounds of Red Lodge waste transfer centre.

Section 31

Recommendation 8:
That consideration is given to extending the landfill search at FCC Milton, Cambridgeshire (...) relating to the eastern area of Cell 22.

Section 30

Recommendation 9:
That CCTV footage captured from within BSE is viewed to the expanded parameter (...).

Section 31

Recommendation 10:
That consideration is given to reviewing the number of (...) requiring training in Major Investigation (...) within Suffolk Constabulary.

Section 30

Recommendation 11:
That consideration is given to submitting (...) for (...) analysis (...).

Section 30
Section 43

Recommendation 12:
That consideration is given to consulting (...).

Section 30
Section 31

Recommendation 13:
That consideration is given to using (...).

Section 30

Recommendation 14:
That in completing (...) enquiries, consideration is given to initiating a (...) enquiry (...).